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1. INTRODUCTION
Parties to the Left have traditionally favoured progressive taxes on income and 
wealth over regressive taxes on consumption.1 However, during the decades fol-
lowing World War II, this attitude changed, and countries with a strong Left be-
came associated with a heavy reliance on consumption taxes (e.g. Steinmo 1993; 
Kato 2003). How did this change come about? And why did some left-wing gov-
ernments expand consumption taxation early, while others lagged behind? In a 
detailed comparative case study of left-wing tax policies in Britain and Sweden, 
I show that individual economic experts were essential in changing ideas con-
cerning taxation and its impact on equality. Though key experts in Britain and 
Sweden – Nicholas Kaldor and Gösta Rehn in particular – presented similar ideas 
and had similar access to key decision-makers, their impact was very different. In 
Sweden, Rehn’s arguments in favour of consumption taxes eventually convinced 
the Social Democrats, and a broad-based sales tax was introduced in 1959. Mean-
while in Britain, Kaldor’s advocacy in favour of the value-added tax (VAT) was 
rejected, and Labour (at a later point) instead adopted his proposal for a Selective 
Employment Tax (in essence a tax on labour in the service sector). 
In order to explain the link between ideology and taxation, we need to under-
stand the impact of experts. Following Lindvall (2009), I argue that experts had 
an impact on the set of tools the Left had at its disposal, but not on the goals of 
economic policy. In practice, this meant changing the dominant view that the path 
to equality was through the taxation of income and capital. By highlighting the 
effect of consumption taxes on evasion and tax revenues, in conjunction with the 
possibility to offset its regressive effects by spending (or changes in other taxes), 
experts provided a new way for the Left to fight inequality. 
However, the presence of experts and their ideas cannot explain the ultimate 
choice made by governments. Why was the idea of an expansion of consumption 
taxation successful in Sweden while it failed in Britain? I argue that the choice 
crucially depends on the political risks involved in introducing regressive taxes. 
Labour in Britain was concerned that the instruments initially suggested by Kal-
dor (e.g. a VAT) would be incompatible with their goals in the long run, and thus 
rejected the idea. In Sweden, on the other hand, the Social Democrats, facing a 
different political environment, were more amenable to broad-based consump-
tion taxes as instruments for economic equality. Thus, the impact of expert ideas 
depends on the strategic situation facing the Left. 
1  Taxes on consumption have been shown to have a regressive impact, while income taxes are 
generally progressive (see, for example, Joumard et al. 2012; Prasad – Deng 2009). 
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There is a wealth of research on the impact of ideology on economic poli-
cy. While early contributions found that left-wing rule is associated with lower 
unemployment, larger governments, and more welfare spending (Cusack 1997; 
Hibbs 1977; Cameron 1978; Hicks –Swank 1992; Kittel – Obinger 2003), a 
recent meta-analysis of 43 studies found no consistent impact of ideology on 
economic policy (Imbeau et al. 2001). Lately, attention has shifted to the coun-
ter-intuitive positive relationship between left-wing dominance and regressive 
taxation of consumption (Kato 2003; Ganghof 2006; Cusack – Beramendi 2006; 
Beramendi – Rueda 2007). These later contributions share the view that the Left 
ideally seeks to tax progressively, but is constrained by corporatism, constitu-
tions, or increased spending pressure coupled with the threat of the exit of capital. 
A related argument is that the Left taxes its own voters primarily for compliance 
reasons (Timmons 2010). In contrast to these studies, I show that the Left some-
times introduces broad-based consumption taxes not because it is constrained, 
but because it genuinely believes that it contributes to the party’s overall goal. 
While much earlier research into the politics of indirect taxation ignores the 
role of experts, there are exceptions (such as Martin 2015). However, even though 
Martin acknowledges that experts had a role in the development of indirect taxa-
tion in Denmark, the main explanatory variable remains the patterns of social 
partnership, not the impact of experts. Moreover, she is mainly concerned with 
the influence of employers’ organisations and right-wing parties, while the puzzle 
this paper explores is why left-wing governments tax consumption. 
Hicks (2013) emphasises the strength of the Left when explaining health care 
policy and relates this to the degree of the unification of the opposition. In a simi-
lar vein, Andersson (2016) highlights the importance of opposition influence in 
explaining tax policy, and stresses how this is partly a function of formal political 
institutions. While these two arguments are helpful in understanding the institu-
tional constraints facing the Left, they cannot explain how the ideas regarding 
consumption taxes evolved. Moreover, fundamental changes in tax policy cannot 
be explained by invoking institutional factors alone. In order to understand the 
change in left-wing attitudes towards consumption taxation, we need to investi-
gate the influence of individual economic experts since the new ideas about con-
sumption taxation and redistribution did not solely come from within the parties 
themselves. 
The next section describes the empirical strategy and introduces the two cases. 
After that, I investigate the impact of economic experts on post-war tax policy 
in Britain and Sweden, with special attention to consumption taxation. The fi-
nal sections elaborate on why the impact of experts was different in Britain and 
Sweden , and what general conclusions can be drawn about the conditional impact 
of experts on tax policy. 
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2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND CASE SELECTION
Britain and Sweden are interesting cases to compare because they not only share 
a number of formal institutional features, but also faced similar conditions and 
challenges after World War II, with experts presenting similar solutions. Interest-
ingly, the choice of solution differed, with Sweden opting for a broad-based sales 
tax and Britain for a tax on employees in the service sector. 
Both Britain and Sweden are unitary constitutional monarchies, and since Brit-
ain was victorious and Sweden neutral during World War II, there was political 
continuity and the Left did not come to power as a result of a radical reshaping of 
the political system. After the war, both countries were ruled by strong left-wing 
governments and both parties advocated for heavier taxation of the rich as a way 
to fight economic inequality and were firmly opposed to consumption taxes (SAP 
election manifesto 1944; Dale 2000: 49f). 
The two countries also faced similar challenges concerning the general eco-
nomic situation and taxation. As a result of wartime spending, taxes in Britain 
and Sweden needed to be brought back to peacetime levels. How this was done 
reflected the political considerations at the time: in Britain, changes in the in-
come tax were mainly aimed at the middle-income working class voters, while in 
Sweden , the temporary sales tax introduced during the war was removed.2
A common problem in both countries was that the income tax not only af-
fected an increasingly larger portion of the working class (as a result of inflation 
and the war), it was also increasingly avoided by the rich who could more easily 
shift between wage and capital income. These factors challenged the prevailing 
orthodoxy that a tax system based on income tax was always preferred from a 
distributional standpoint. 
A contextual factor salient in both countries was inflation, which was used by 
Labour to motivate increases in a number of excises (whose regressive effect to 
some degree was compensated for by raised food subsidies). Similarly, the initial 
response to inflation in Sweden was to use excises, but also the interest rate. 
The main focus of the case studies is economic experts, their ideas, and their 
access to key decision-makers. The political party/coalition making up the gov-
ernment is a key actor since it is effectively setting tax policy. Although the focus 
is on Left-parties, the preferences of parties to the right are also important, as they 
affect the risk assessment of the Left. Attention will also be paid to trade unions 
2  Britain had a so-called purchase tax, but this was mainly on luxury goods and with differenti-
ated rates. Thus, it was a consumption tax, but with decidedly progressive elements. While 
keeping the tax after the war, in 1948 Labour decided not to broaden the base of the tax since 
it was “not politically defensible” (Whiting 2000: 91). 
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and employers’ organisations since, as earlier research has argued, they are cru-
cial in explaining tax policy change (see, e.g., Beramendi – Rueda 2007; Martin 
2015). However, it is important to bear in mind that the parliament sets tax policy, 
not unions (Bradley et al. 2003). 
3. BRITISH POST-WAR TAX POLICY AND THE INFLUENCE 
OF NICHOLAS KALDOR
As a general principle, preferring income to consumption tax worked well in the 
pre-Second World War era when most Labour voters did not reach the income 
required to pay the tax. But when Clement Attlee was appointed Prime Minister 
in 1946 the situation had changed. Income tax now reached also the working 
class and as part of returning Britain to peace time tax levels, the standard rate of 
income tax was reduced from 50 to 45 percent (Thorpe 2008: 123). The failure to 
introduce a tax on capital gains and/or wealth during Attlee’s prime ministership 
was cited later as the main contributor to rising inequality, and it shaped the tax 
debate within Labour during the following years in opposition. 
Debating indirect taxation in opposition 
Despite being rewarded in the polls, Labour lost the 1951 election (Thorpe 2008: 
140).3 The new Churchill government shifted economic policy in a generally re-
gressive direction by abolishing food subsidies and lowering income tax rates. 
Although the Tories did introduce a short-run capital gains tax, its main purpose 
was to fight avoidance, not to reduce inequality (Whiting 2000: 155). No major 
changes to the tax systems were implemented and tax policy was used more for 
appeasing unions than for providing incentives (Daunton 2002: 264). 
Labour spent these years in opposition re-evaluating its tax policies. As men-
tioned above, avoidance among top income earners had undermined the pro-
gressivity of the income tax and alternative methods of taxation were discussed 
(Whiting 2000: 152). An important development was that the impact of taxation 
on efficiency and revenue gained more attention. Labour MP Anthony Crosland 
stated in 1962 that what he called “socialist” taxes “should therefore enable us to 
3  The election resulted in the largest vote share in Labour history, 48.8%, but the 13,948,883 
votes brought only 295 seats, while the Conservatives’ 48% of the votes produced 321. These 
dramatic results caused by the electoral system were not uncommon in Britain, and is an im-
portant difference between the British and Swedish political system (Heclo 2010: 37). 
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consider […] certain elastic and high yielding indirect taxes – a general turnover 
tax, a differential payroll tax, or a graduated and much higher employers’ national 
insurance contribution. … For what matters is the total progressiveness of the tax 
system – and, if we want to redress its total imbalance, its total yield” (quoted in 
Whiting 2000: 151). 
One of the more innovative suggestions came from the Cambridge economist 
(and member of the 1956 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and In-
come) Nicholas Kaldor, who suggested a tax based on spending. Instead of using 
income as a tax base, which punished savings, Kaldor suggested using an individ-
ual’s spending power, which also included wealth and irregular income (Kaldor 
1955).4 While economists in the party supported the proposed tax, it was rejected 
because of its expected unpopularity and departure from the orthodox view that 
strongly favoured the income tax (Whiting 2000: 137). 
During these years, Hugh Gaitskell, shadow Chancellor from 1951 until 1955 
(when he became Leader of the Opposition), realised that increasing redistribu-
tion through the income tax alone was no longer possible, but instead turned his 
attention towards property as the main culprit of inequality (Ellison 2002: 86). 
A proposed capital levy was considered unviable in terms of public opinion and 
the prevailing position in the later 1950s was in support for a capital gains tax, a 
tax on gifts, and taxation of unearned incomes (ibid. 87f). 
In sum, debate and deliberation within the party during the opposition years 
prepared Labour for reforms when they returned to power after winning the 1964 
general election. Several new instruments such as the expenditure tax were pre-
sented, but while versions of broad-based consumption taxes were discussed, 
momentum shifted in favour of taxes on capital because of the regressive effects 
of the former. After winning the election, Labour employed Nicholas Kaldor as 
special adviser to the Chancellor on taxation, which proved to be of great impor-
tance for future Labour tax policy (NK/10/1/2 1964). 
Back in power: the 1965 budget 
The first budget under Prime Minister Harold Wilson (who took office in 1964) 
was not only concerned with raising revenue and minimising avoidance, but also 
with making the tax system fairer.5 The budget reformed and simplified the cor-
4  Kaldor also suggested what he called “the expenditure tax” in his minority report to the Royal 
Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income 1956. 
5  The budget was fiercely debated and took twice the time in parliament than normal (Whiting 
2000: 160). 
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poration tax, but the changes did not have a noticeable impact on inequality and 
were revenue neutral. It also introduced a comprehensive capital gains tax (both 
long and short run) as compensation for union wage restraint (Daunton 2002: 
292), but due to business pressure, the rate was set to 30 per cent, which was 
lower than the income tax rate (Whiting 2000: 163). 
Critics within the party were concerned that the focus on avoidance would cre-
ate an excessively intrusive tax administration and that the budget would dispro-
portionately hurt small business. As an alternative, they suggested a broad-based 
consumption tax and a lower income tax. The Labour leadership was aware of the 
deficiencies in the income tax, but instead of introducing a new tax on consump-
tion, they decided to strengthen the legitimacy of the income tax by making it 
more progressive and by increasing efforts to combat avoidance (ibid. 167). 
In the years following the budget, the consensus was that the tax administration 
needed time to catch up before new tax reforms could be implemented. During 
this time, the value-added tax (VAT) re-emerged on the agenda (ibid. 171). For 
example, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) criticised the extent of gov-
ernment expenditures and the level of direct taxes, and recommended lower ex-
penditures overall and a shift from direct to indirect taxation (ibid. 193). 
During the same time, the first empirical investigations on the incidence of 
indirect taxes emerged, showing how hard the poor were hit by existing excise 
and consumption taxes. Poverty was no longer simply an issue of class, and re-
ducing inequality increasingly meant spending more on the poor. This increased 
tensions within Labour between representing the unions and reducing inequality, 
and slowed down Labour’s efforts to redistribute from the middle to the poor 
(Whiting 2000: 173ff). Despite these tensions, inequality was reduced and the 
situation of the poor improved (ibid. 181–183). 
An unorthodox alternative to the VAT 
When the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) suggested a VAT 
back in 1963, Labour rejected it with reference to its adverse effects on inequality 
(Daunton 2002: 289). But when it was discussed again in 1965, it was mainly as 
a solution to Britain’s balance of payment problem (CAB/129/121 1965). Since 
Labour did not want to devalue the pound sterling, other measures – such as 
changing elements of the tax system – were considered. A VAT was proposed 
as a way of offering export incentives without violating the rules of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). But critics soon pointed out that the 
existing purchase tax did not fall on exports, so replacing it with a VAT would not 
be an improvement in this regard. 
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Since the effect of a VAT on exports was unclear, two other advantages were 
emphasised. First, by the mid-1960s, it was generally believed that Labour 
could not raise income taxes more without serious electoral backlash (Whiting 
2000:197) and Labour had explicitly ruled out any increases in the income tax in 
a public statement before the 1966 election (Thirlwall 1987: 242). A VAT would 
allow Labour to extract more revenue at less political cost. Second, expanding the 
existing purchase tax (at that time covering only selected goods) would result in 
a political fight over every added good; introducing a VAT covering virtually all 
goods and services (which were not covered by the purchase tax) would be far 
easier politically (Daunton 2002: 294). 
Notwithstanding its advantages, many within Labour viewed VAT as politically 
dangerous because of its regressive effects. Nicholas Kaldor – at this time a VAT 
supporter – proposed a solution: by replacing social contributions (essentially a 
regressive flat-rate poll tax) with a VAT, the regressive impact would be mitigat-
ed. Kaldor also pointed out that the VAT would raise considerable revenue with 
less distortion of production and consumption. His proposal was met with heavy 
resistance from the Treasury, the Board of Trade, and the Department of Eco-
nomic Affairs. The most serious objection was that contributions fell on labour, 
while the VAT would also hurt groups outside of the labour force such as married 
women and pensioners. Moreover, Customs and Excise were concerned about the 
administrative costs associated with the new tax (Daunton 2002: 295f). 
Regardless of these objections, the problems of weak exports and increasing 
revenue needs were still urgent. At this point, Kaldor presented an alternative 
that promised to solve these problems without resorting to the dreaded VAT: the 
Selective Employment Tax (SET). The tax was paid by the employer based on 
the number of employees, with tax rebates to the manufacturing sector. The SET 
would encourage reallocation of labour from the service sector to manufactur-
ing, as well as raise revenues (which would partly be used to subsidise exports) 
(Whiting 2000: 198). Most importantly, it would be more politically palatable 
than a VAT (Daunton 2002: 297f). Labour preferred this solution to the intro-
duction of a broad-based, regressive consumption tax and introduced the SET 
already in 1966. 
While Labour Chancellor Callaghan was pleased with this solution, the Trade 
Union Confederation (TUC) was not. It expressed concern about the equity ef-
fects of the SET and with the overall progressivity of the tax system. But although 
the SET was not the best solution,6 the TUC preferred it to a broad-based VAT 
(NK 11/17/8-12 1970). The CBI and the Tories on the other hand preferred a 
6  The TUC preferred a progressive Selective Payroll Tax (SPT), a tax that – it was argued – 
would retain the beneficial effects of the SET, but with a less regressive profile. 
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VAT (Rollings 2003: 235; Lynch 2003: 59), especially in combination with Brit-
ain joining the European Economic Community (EEC). 
The VAT question was intimately tied to the EEC since membership required 
the harmonisation of several taxes. In connection with Britain’s second applica-
tion to the EEC, a Committee (of which Kaldor was a member, as was fellow 
Hungarian-British economist Thomas Balogh) was set up to investigate the im-
pact of introducing a VAT.7 Despite the expectations of Prime Minister Wilson, 
the report recommended not to introduce the VAT – even though it acknowledged 
that a VAT would solve the revenue problem – for three reasons: (1) Britain did 
not have the problem with cascading turnover taxes that made other European 
countries positive toward the tax; (2) introducing the VAT would mean signifi-
cantly higher administrative costs; and (3) a VAT would not enhance industrial 
efficiency the way the SET did (328/100 1967). In something of an anticlimax, 
the second application was also vetoed by de Gaulle (in 1967) and the report was 
never even discussed in the committee (Whiting 2000: 204). Thus, it is hard to 
judge the policy impact of this report and, by extension, the advice of Kaldor as 
a member. 
Conclusion
Post-war tax politics in Britain was characterised by the crisis of the existing tax 
system and the struggle to find new solutions to inequality, funding needs, and 
industrial efficiency. Among the economic experts providing advice and ideas, 
Nicholas Kaldor stands out, first as an academic and later as special adviser. 
Advising the Wilson ministry, he presented several ideas of how taxation could 
solve problems related to the balance of payments and revenue needs. However, 
his initial propositions regarding consumption taxation were rejected with refer-
ence to the distributive impact. Labour resistance towards broad-based consump-
tion taxes was related to political risk and this led Kaldor to present alterna-
tive solutions. Labour accepted the SET since it was more acceptable politically, 
while solving similar problems as a VAT. While Kaldor did not influence the 
goals of Labour policy, he did provide a number of alternatives to reach them. 
When Labour rejected one alternative because it was too risky (the VAT), Kaldor 
quickly provided a safer alternative (the SET). This suggests that the influence 
of expert ideas is not unconditional, but depends on the political situation facing 
the government. 
7  The first application was submitted by the Macmillan ministry and vetoed by Charles de 
Gaulle in 1963. 
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4. EXPANDING CONSUMPTION TAXATION IN SWEDEN
During the World War II, all parties in the Swedish parliament (the Riksdag), 
except for the pro-Soviet Communists, were represented in government. The So-
cial Democratic Party (SAP) was victorious in the 1944 election, but the wartime 
government remained in office until the end of the war. When SAP Prime Min-
ister Per Albin Hansson died in 1946, he was succeeded by Tage Erlander, who 
went on to lead the country for the next twenty-three years.8
After the war, all political parties agreed that Sweden should return to peace-
time taxation, which meant removing the temporary sales tax and lowering the in-
come tax. The SAP tax policies were heavily influenced by – and debated with – 
two prominent economists from the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO): 
Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. 
The sales tax is abolished (and mourned) 
The SAP had always been hostile towards indirect taxes, which were seen as 
regressive and unfair. The 1944 party program (in effect until 1960) called for 
redistribution and progressive taxation, in particular on wealth and income. In an 
economic environment with stable prices and high brackets for the income tax, 
shifting taxation from indirect to direct meant that better-off citizens paid more. 
However, as in the British case, inflation led to bracket creep, pushing more and 
more working class voters into the income tax. As if this was not enough, tax 
evasion at the top was rampant, with the well-off having little trouble transform-
ing their income from wage to capital. This prompted the party to re-evaluate its 
stance on indirect and direct taxation, and made it open to new ideas. 
The temporary broad-based sales tax (the “oms”)9 was introduced to meet the 
sharply increased defence spending during the war and was abolished in 1947. 
Interestingly, the SAP finance minister overseeing the removal of the oms – Ernst 
Wigforss – later described the abolition of the tax as a mistake driven by political 
necessity. It was not possible to lower a progressive tax like the income tax and at 
8  Of course, this was not something the SAP knew at the time. In fact, the risk of losing power 
was always present and the party could only form a majority government once (in 1968).
9  “oms” is short for “omsättningsskatt”, literally “turnover tax”. A tax referred to as “försäljn-
ingsskatt” was introduced in 1948, but although the literal translation is “sales tax” this 
tax concerned only a few goods: precious metals, pearls, certain carpets, and gramophone 
records and related equipment (1952 års kommitté för indirekta skatter 1957:.60). I employ 
the commonly used translation “sales tax” for “omsättningsskatt” (see for example Steinmo 
(1993:126) or simply “oms” when referring to this tax. 
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the same time keep a regressive consumption tax, especially not since SAP had a 
very narrow majority in the parliament (Wigforss 1954: 336ff.). 
But it was not only actors within the ruling left-wing party that mourned the 
demise of the oms: as early as 1946, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner – prominent 
LO economists – started to argue in favour of indirect taxes on consumption (e.g. 
Rehn 1946). This was followed by similar articles in the SAP magazine Tiden 
(1948) and in the LO outlet Fackföreningsrörelsen (1946). Rehn, together with 
future Governor of the central bank, Per Åsbrink, claimed that removing the oms 
had been a mistake and that judging indirect taxes only on its incidence and not 
what the revenue is used for was like throwing the baby out with the bathwa-
ter (Åsbrink – Rehn 1951). Although taxes on consumption hurt the poor, if the 
revenues were spent disproportionally on these groups, there should be no quar-
rel with the tax on distributional grounds. Moreover, taxation of consumption 
had two additional advantages. First, it was harder to avoid than the increasingly 
avoided income tax. Second, in a time of rising prices and full employment, con-
sumption tax was seen as a formidable tool for balancing the economy. Conscious 
about the political difficulties of such a reform, Rehn cited a recent poll where 
respondents were asked whether they preferred removing the oms or keeping the 
oms if it financed certain social policies. Among the working class, 39% wanted 
to keep the oms, while 51% wanted it abolished (Rehn 1946), suggesting that the 
electoral risks associated with the oms were exaggerated. 
Experts also influenced the debate through two public inquires, one into di-
rect (1951) and another concerning indirect (1957) taxation. The report issued 
in 1951, which was the result of the committee on direct taxation commissioned 
in 1949, is interesting for several reasons. First, the report – supposedly focus-
ing only on direct taxation – spends considerable amount of ink on the balance 
between indirect and direct taxation, sparking a serious debate on the issue. Sec-
ond, the report allowed Gösta Rehn, an official member of the commission, to 
fully express his views on the matter (which had not changed since his earlier 
writings).10 Both unions and business peak organisations agreed with the main 
points of the report, although they differed in their preferred level of total taxation 
(Konseljakt (Cabinet meeting) 31 mars 1952). 
Despite the recommendations in the 1951 report – and the support from the 
unions and industry associations – no major changes were made to indirect taxa-
tion during the following years. The priority was fighting inflation and instead 
of using a re-introduced sales tax to do this, the government chose excises and 
increased interest rates. 
10  However, since his opinion diverged from that of the LO, he could not use his own name. The 
dissenting opinion of E. Åkerström is in fact the opinion of Rehn (Elvander 1972). 
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During this period, Rehn and Meidner met repeatedly with Prime Minister 
Erlander and other ministers discussing the issue of indirect taxation. In 1955, 
Meidner suggested a re-introduction of the oms, but representatives from the 
government were hesitant, and the Finance Minister (Per Edvin Sköld) was out-
right hostile to the idea (Erlander 1976: 265). Erlander writes that although the 
ideas of Rehn and Meidner later became central to SAP economic policy, they 
were politically impossible to implement at the time (Erlander 1974: 235f, 1976: 
39). Rehn continued his advocacy not only in meetings and internal memos to the 
SAP, but also – as mentioned above – in the labour movement press. 
The return of the “oms” 
The reintroduction of the general sales tax was preceded by the second major 
tax inquiry of the decade, published in 1957: the 1952 Committee on Indirect 
Taxation (of which Rudolf Meidner was a member). The report concluded that 
indirect taxation had several advantages over direct taxation. First, indirect taxes 
had lower administrative costs, especially compared with the rates of current 
direct taxes. Second, a move to indirect taxes on consumption would reduce 
tax evasion and have a positive effect on work incentives and savings. Third, 
consumption taxes would provide a more effective and flexible tool for fight-
ing inflation. The report recommended that the new consumption tax should be 
broad-based with uniform rates (although some goods could be excluded for 
special reasons). Importantly, the committee acknowledged the fact that these 
types of taxes hit some groups – such as families and pensioners – especially 
hard, and recommended compensating these groups using government spend-
ing rather than providing exemptions or lower rates for certain goods (1952 års 
kommittée för indirekta skatter 1957).11 The report formed the basis for the later 
decision in the parliament. 
Although the LO agreed with some of the proposed advantages with indirect 
taxation, such as lower evasion and its possible use in fighting inflation, it ad-
vised against the tax. The main reason was the fear that compensation through 
government transfers might be a temporary arrangement, while the tax would be 
permanent. Surprisingly, even though the LO was opposed to this particular tax, 
it states that a VAT could be plausible in the future as a replacement for the tax on 
profits (Konseljakt (Cabinet meeting) 9 oktober 1959: 21). 
11  The report was careful to leave the issue of whether the tax should be introduced or not up to 
the parliament. 
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The Federation of Swedish Industries recommended an immediate introduction 
of a general consumption tax if it meant maintained or lower overall tax levels, 
but strongly advised against the tax as a way of expanding government (ibid.). 
The decision 
The SAP government was finally convinced by the arguments in support of a 
broad-based sales tax, and claiming the LO opposition was weakening, Erlander 
decided to go through with the reintroduction of the oms in 1959. 
Surprisingly to the SAP (minority) government, none of the right-wing parties 
supported a reintroduction of the oms. This meant they had to rely on the Com-
munists to push through the bill (Erlander 1976: 267ff).12
In the parliamentary debates, the Conservatives (Högerpartiet), the Liberals 
(Folkpartiet), the Farmer’s League (Bondeförbundet) as well as the Communists 
were strongly opposed to a reintroduction of the sales tax, albeit for very differ-
ent reasons. The Right – primarily the liberals and the conservatives – feared that 
a return of the sales tax would increase the size of government. For the Com-
munists, the sales tax represented a regressive tax hurting the poorest workers 
the most, and thus unacceptable (Andra Kammarens Protokoll [minutes of the 
second chamber] 1959). 
The reintroduction of the oms lead to a significant increase of revenues from 
consumption taxes, less dependence on the income tax, as well as sharply in-
creased social spending (Andersson – Brambor 2015; Flora et al. 1983). Accord-
ing to a poll made prior to the 1960 general election (in 1959), most SAP voters 
opposed the oms, but after the election, a majority supported the tax. Särlvik 
(1967) presents data suggesting this was an effect of SAP appealing to attitudes 
toward welfare expenditure and party loyalty during the election campaign. SAP 
also gained three seats in the election (Nohlen – Stöver 2010: 1872), indicating 
that the strategy paid off. That is, it seems Rehn was right in that compensatory 
spending could help sell the oms. 
Conclusion
Through publications in labour outlets, government reports, and personal meet-
ings with key ministers, economic experts such as Rehn and Meidner influenced 
the instruments available to the Social Democratic government. As in the British 
12  The Communist Party had the choice between accepting the oms or in effect terminating the 
SAP government. It chose the former. 
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case, the experts did not affect the ultimate goals of policy, but they did affect the 
instruments available to reach them. 
Interestingly, in 1959 the SAP stance was more in line with the opinion of busi-
ness peak organisations and economic experts than with the LO.13 Moreover, the 
right-wing parties in parliament also opposed the tax. 
As Steinmo (1993, ch. 5) has pointed out, an important factor in Swedish poli-
tics during this era was the SAP majority in the upper chamber. However, prob-
ably more important is the fact that there was no unified strong opposition at the 
time (see also Hicks 2013). The Social Democrats had been in coalition with the 
Farmer’s League from 1951 to 1957 and, more often than not, the Right disagreed 
among themselves on economic policy. This, coupled with SAP being the larg-
est party in parliament, meant it could reasonably expect to have influence over 
policy in the future – even when not in government – and this extended its time 
horizon and lowered the risks associated with consumption taxation. 
5. HOW ECONOMIC EXPERTS MATTER
In both countries, the Left traditionally considered income tax to be the prime 
tool to reduce economic inequalities. But the situation after the war – with in-
come taxes affecting the working class, while the rich could increasingly avoid 
it – made policy makers in both Britain and Sweden amenable to new ideas. Eco-
nomic experts in Britain (primarily Nicholas Kaldor) and Sweden (mainly Gösta 
Rehn and Rudolf Meidner) argued that a broad-based consumption tax would be 
harder to avoid, have less harmful effects on the economy, and generate consider-
able revenues. Conscious about the ultimate goal of left-wing governments, the 
experts were careful in emphasising how the regressive impact of the tax could 
be counteracted (through replacement of contributions in Britain or increased 
transfers in Sweden). 
Kaldor, Rehn, and Meidner were all members of important committees on 
taxation, where they were able to shape the policy debate.14 They also had ac-
cess to key decision-makers: Kaldor as special adviser on taxation and Rehn and 
Meidner in their repeated meetings with Erlander and key ministers. An important 
13  In its opinion on the 1959 report, LO acknowledges that compensation might work, but judges 
the political problems too hard to overcome. Curiously, in the same document, the LO comes 
out in favour of a VAT, suggesting that the technical implementation of the sales tax was the 
issue, not the general shift towards consumption taxation. 
14  Although Kaldor’s most influential role was as co-author of the minority report to the main 
1956 report (where he proposed the expenditure tax) and Rehn had to use another name to be 
able to fully express his views in the 1951 report.
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difference is that while both Rehn and Meidner were affiliated with LO, Kaldor 
came from academia. As Lindvall (2009) notes, experts provided instruments to 
reach a certain goal, but did not affect the goal itself. 
Although the experts provided similar ideas concerning consumption taxation 
– in particular the advantages of a broad-based consumption tax – these were 
adopted by the SAP, but not by Labour. Why was the SAP government more 
amenable to this type of expert advice than Labour? A key factor seems to have 
been the long-term effects of changes to the tax system. Labour, facing a more 
uncertain future if losing an election (since the incoming government would be 
a strong Conservative majority government), preferred a tax policy that did not 
cement regressive elements. This concern was also the main explanation for TUC 
resistance. Thus, choosing Kaldor’s less dangerous alternative – the SET – over 
the highly contentious VAT made sense given the political context. 
The role of the future in shaping the risks associated with tax reforms is re-
lated to the literature on policy insulation. Building on the work by de Figueiredo 
(2002), Hicks (2013) argues that in the case of health care policy, Labour strate-
gically locked in redistributive elements in order to constrain future Conserva-
tive governments, while Sweden opted for a system prioritising administrative 
efficiency. The reason for this difference, he argues, is that the Left was weak in 
Britain and thus needed to use the opportunity while in power to tie the hands of 
future governments. The reluctance of Labour to “lock in” regressive elements in 
the tax code through a VAT can be seen as a case of this more general behaviour 
of trying to tie the hands of your successor. In the 1967 report on the VAT, the 
flexibility and freedom associated with the existing system of indirect taxation 
was cited as a main advantage over the VAT, which if introduced would constrain 
efforts to mitigate the regressive impact of consumption taxes by, for example, 
exempting certain goods (PRO T 328/100 1967). In essence, Labour wanted to 
lock in policies that reduced inequality (such as their health care system), but not 
regressive policies such as the VAT. 
Hicks links the strength of the left to the type of opposition they were facing: a 
strong unified Right in Britain, and a divided Right in Sweden. In a similar argument, 
Andersson (2016) relates expectations of the future to formal political institutions, 
leading the Left in Sweden to expect more influence as an opposition party than in 
Britain.15 This arguably lowered the political risk associated with the reintroduction 
15  Of the 17 British elections between 1920 and 1980, 14 resulted in single party majorities, but 
only in two cases did the winning party secure a majority of the popular vote (Butler – Butler 
2010). In contrast, in the 19 Swedish elections between 1920 and 1980, there was only one 
single-party majority government (after the 1968 election). The period is otherwise dominated 
by single-party minority governments and coalitions (Hadenius 2003). 
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of the oms in Sweden. In sum, there are several factors making the risks of losing 
power greater for the Left in Britain than in Sweden and, by extension, the risks as-
sociated with consumption taxes. Thus, the impact of experts on left-wing taxation 
is not uniform but depends on the political environment facing the government. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are several similarities in the British and Swedish post-war tax debate. Both 
countries struggled with what to do with temporary tax measures implemented 
during the war, as well as with inflation and tax avoidance. Moreover, both SAP 
and Labour were initially hostile towards consumption taxes and in both coun-
tries ideas challenging this orthodoxy started to emerge in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Why did these new ideas prevail in Sweden, while the Labour Party 
in Britain opted for the SET? 
In line with Lindvall (2009), economic experts influenced the instruments 
used, not the goals. Importantly, while the goals were the same in Britain and 
Sweden (reducing inequality), and some of the suggested instruments were the 
same (the VAT), the choices made were different. The reason for this, I argue, is 
the different political environment facing the Left in Britain vis-à-vis in Sweden. 
This is likely related to how institutions guide expectations and regulate opposi-
tion influence, factors that have been shown to be important for left-wing policy 
elsewhere (e.g. Andersson 2016; Hicks 2013). 
The case supports the contention that the Left is more amenable to certain 
solutions depending on their strategic situation. This is evident in the British case 
where Nicholas Kaldor first advocated the VAT, and then, when the VAT was 
rejected with reference to political risk, suggested a safer alternative (the SET), 
which was later adopted. In the Swedish case, the political risks were lower and 
experts such as Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner had greater success in promoting 
the reintroduction of the oms. 
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